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Visual-shape competition during language-mediated




Gerry T. M. Altmann
University of York, UK
Visual attention can be directed immediately, as a spoken word unfolds, towards
conceptually related but nonassociated objects, even if they mismatch on other
dimensions that would normally determine which objects in the scene were
appropriate referents for the unfolding word (Huettig & Altmann, 2005). Here we
demonstrate that the mapping between language and concurrent visual objects
can also be mediated by visual-shape relations. On hearing ‘‘snake’’, participants
directed overt attention immediately, within a visual display depicting four objects,
to a picture of an electric cable, although participants had viewed the visual
display with four objects for approximately 5 s before hearing the target word*
sufficient time to recognize the objects for what they were. The time spent fixating
the cable correlated significantly with ratings of the visual similarity between
snakes in general and this particular cable. Importantly, with sentences
contextually biased towards the concept snake, participants looked at the snake
well before the onset of ‘‘snake’’, but they did not look at the visually similar
cable until hearing ‘‘snake’’. Finally, we demonstrate that such activation can,
under certain circumstances (e.g., during the processing of dominant meanings of
homonyms), constrain the direction of visual attention even when it is clearly
contextually inappropriate. We conclude that language-mediated attention can be
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guided by a visual match between spoken words and visual objects, but that such
a match is based on lexical input and may not be modulated by contextual
appropriateness.
Casual conversation is typically conceived of as an effortless activity yet,
even on superficial analysis, securing a mapping between the surface
structure of a given word and its intended meaning can be far from
transparent. Recently, the visual world paradigm (Cooper, 1974; Tanenhaus,
Spivey-Knowlton, Eberhard, & Sedivy, 1995) has begun to illuminate some
very basic questions concerning the online interpretation of speech and its
integration with visual context (see Henderson & Ferreira, 2004, for recent
review).
Cooper (1974) showed in an early visual world study that participants
tended to spontaneously fixate the visual referents of words concurrently
heard. For instance, they were more likely to fixate the picture of a snake
when hearing ‘‘snake’’1 or part of ‘‘snake’’ than pictures of referents of
unrelated control words (see also Allopenna, Magnuson, & Tanenhaus,
1998; Dahan, Magnuson, & Tanenhaus, 2001). Moreover, participants were
more likely to fixate pictures showing a snake, a zebra, or a lion when
hearing the semantically related word ‘‘Africa’’ than they were to fixate
referents of semantically unrelated control words. In this respect, the pattern
of eye movements reflected the online activation of word semantics and its
integration with concurrent visual objects (see also Yee & Sedivy, 2006, for a
similar result). We (Huettig & Altmann, 2005) recently further pursued this
finding by investigating whether semantic properties of individual lexical
items could direct eye movements towards objects in the visual field in the
absence of any associative relationships between the words heard and the
concurrent visual objects. Our participants were shown a visual display
containing four pictures of common objects. During the course of a trial, a
spoken sentence was presented to the participant and the participant’s eye
movements were tracked as the sentence unfolded. We found that
participants directed overt attention immediately towards a picture of an
object such as a trumpet when a semantically related but nonassociated
target word (e.g., ‘‘piano’’) was heard. Three different measures of semantic
relatedness (McRae feature norms, Cree & McRae, 2003; LSA, Landauer &
Dumais, 1997; contextual similarity, McDonald, 2000) each separately
correlated well with fixation behaviour (Huettig & Altmann, 2005;
Huettig, Quinlan, McDonald, & Altmann, 2006). These data suggest that
language-mediated eye movements to objects in the concurrent visual
1 Double quotes and italic font are used to denote spoken language materials.













































environment are driven by semantic similarity in addition to associative
knowledge.
Given the observed conceptual synergies, it is important to explore
perceptual synergies in a similar fashion. Little attention has focused on
examining the interaction of spoken language with directed attention and
the visual properties of the presented objects. In this regard, Cooper (1974)
also found that participants tended to fixate a picture of a snake when
hearing the word ‘‘wormed’’ (in the context ‘‘just as I had wormed my way on
my stomach’’). This finding (although not discussed by Cooper) suggests that
there may also be a strong link between lexical processing and the visual
properties of an object such as an object’s shape (although it cannot be ruled
out that in Cooper’s experiment participants mistook the snake for a worm
and therefore directed their attention to the picture of the snake when
hearing ‘‘wormed’’).
The question of whether perceptual information (such as an object’s
visual shape) becomes automatically available on hearing a spoken word
such as ‘‘coin’’ has attracted some attention in language comprehension
research, although the data have at times been contradictory. Schreuder and
colleagues (e.g., Flores d’Arcais, Schreuder, & Glazenborg, 1985; Schreuder,
Flores d’Arcais, & Glazenborg, 1984) obtained significantly facilitated
target naming times for perceptually related word pairs (button-coin), and
proposed a model of lexical activation in which perceptual representations
are activated very rapidly during spoken word recognition. However, Pecher,
Zeelenberg, and Raaijmakers (1998) found perceptual priming only if
participants were first given practice in categorizing primes and targets in
a perceptual categorization task. Moss, McCormick, and Tyler (1997)
reported a significant priming effect for perceptual targets (e.g., pairs with
a similar visual-shape such as hook and curve) using a lexical decision task.
Kellenbach, Wijers, and Mulder (2000) obtained robust perceptual priming
as indexed by the ERP N400 component but, contrary to Moss et al.,
observed no effect for the same materials from the ERP study when used in a
lexical decision task.
The lack of consensus in the comprehension literature suggests that the
visual world paradigm may be particularly useful for investigating how rapidly,
and under what circumstances, visual-shape information becomes available
during spoken word processing. This is because of the closely time-locked,
fine-grained effects the method has been shown to provide (e.g., Allopenna
et al., 1998; Dahan et al., 2001; Salverda, Dahan, & McQueen, 2003).
Recently, Dahan and Tanenhaus (2005) explored how the probability of
fixating a rope depicted within a display of four objects changed as
participants in a ‘‘visual-world’’ study were instructed to use a mouse to
click on a snake depicted in the same visual display. Participants would hear
a single word, such as ‘‘snake’’, and had to click on the snake. Dahan













































and Tanenhaus found that the rope was fixated more often, from between
200 and 300 ms post word onset, than the distractors (e.g., an umbrella and a
couch). They concluded that ‘‘participants could orient their gaze toward an
object’s spatial location because its structural representation matches
the visual representation of the concept activated by the phonetic input’’
(p. 457).
At first glance, such a result may seem unsurprising. However, it rules out
two possibilities regarding the nature of the process that guides the eyes
towards named objects in the visual field. First, and as pointed out by
Dahan and Tanenhaus (2005), it rules out the possibility that this guidance is
based merely on phonological information associated with the visual
objects*that is, it could not be the case that participants are covertly
naming objects in the visual field, and then using the match between these
names and the unfolding speech stream to guide eye movements towards
whichever phonological matches are so obtained (this possibility is also
ruled out by our earlier semantic competitor effects; Huettig & Altmann,
2004, 2005). Second, it rules out the possibility, permitted by our earlier
competitor effects, that guidance is based only on semantic fit between the
concepts activated by the visual objects and the concepts activated by the
objects referred to in the speech stream. In principle, knowing that there is a
trumpet in the visual field, and hearing ‘‘trumpet’’, may cause reorientation
towards the trumpet without the need for visual form information to
mediate that orientation process; the same conceptual-semantics that causes
orientation towards the trumpet when hearing ‘‘piano’’ would instead be
responsible*visual form would be implicated only in the process that
mediates between experiencing the visual image of the object and activating
that object’s associated conceptual semantics. The idea that guidance might
be purely semantic is not implausible given the unreliability of visual form
(due to changes in perspective and the fact that, in the dynamically changing
world, objects’ forms can change on a moment-by-moment basis).
Although compelling, the Dahan and Tanenhaus (2005) study leaves a
number of questions unanswered. First, the snake and its visual competitor,
the rope, were copresent in the display. But would the same effects be
obtained if the rope was the only item that visually resembled a snake in the
display? As we shall argue below, this is a critical case that allows us to
explore in more detail Dahan and Tanenhaus’ conclusion that ‘‘finding the
referent of a linguistic expression in a circumscribed context is similar to that
of natural visual search in which the ‘top-down’ target representation,
activated from the spoken input, is mapped onto the ‘bottom-up’ scene
representation’’ (p. 457). It is certainly true that in a task in which
participants have to click on a named object, an element of visual search
may be required (see Vickery, King, & Jiang, 2005, for research within the
standard visual search paradigm). However, as Dahan and Tanenhaus













































themselves point out, their conclusion may not hold for other visual world
tasks. In other versions of the paradigm, we suspect that an alternative view
of the relationship between linguistic expressions and scene representation is
required: one in which the ‘‘top-down’’ target representation is visually
derived (i.e., a picture-derived representation), and it is the ‘‘bottom-up’’
spoken input (i.e., a language-derived representation) onto which this is
mapped.
In the visual world paradigm, objects are generally presented in the
participant’s visual field before the referring expressions that might pick out
one object or another. Thus, by the time the target linguistic expression (e.g.,
‘‘snake’’) is encountered, conceptual representations corresponding to the
objects in the visual field will already have been activated. These
representations would include episodic knowledge regarding the location
of the objects in the visual field and their actual form, as well as semantic
knowledge about these objects (which may include their ‘‘prototypical
form’’*the visual form derived from the visual scene may be subject to
distortions of perspective). Thus, we believe that the picture-derived
representation has no less a ‘‘top-down’’ influence than have the language-
derived representations due to the spoken input; language-derived con-
ceptual representations are no more mapped onto the visual display than are
picture-derived conceptual representations mapped onto the language.
One of the aims of the present research is, within the context of visual
competitor effects, to distinguish between an account based on language
activating ‘‘top-down’’ representations that are subsequently mapped onto
‘‘bottom-up’’ visual display information (cf. Dahan & Tanenhaus, 2005) and
an account based on language representations modulating the activation of
(already activated) conceptual visual display-based representations. To do
this, we shall ask how visual competition might be mediated by linguistic
context. For example, in the context of the sentence fragment ‘‘the man was
worried, but then he saw the snake’’, how would looks towards the snake (in
some appropriate task) differ as compared with the case ‘‘the zookeeper was
worried, but then he saw the snake’’? We predict that there will be more looks
towards the snake even before the word ‘‘snake’’ was heard, just because of
the relationship between zookeepers and snakes (cf. the semantic ‘‘priming’’
effect reported by Huettig & Altmann, 2005). Perhaps hearing ‘‘zookeeper
worried greatly’’ activates to some degree the conceptual representation
associated with snakes, and this drives the eyes to whatever in the visual
scene matches the featural specification associated with snakes (both
semantic and physical). But how would this bias affect looks towards a
rope (or a cable) in the absence of a snake? If hearing ‘‘zookeeper worried
greatly’’ activates the conceptual representation associated with snakes, and
if this in turn activates visual representations associated with snakes, we
should see increased looks towards the rope in such snake-biasing contexts.













































Alternatively, when the snake is present (and not the rope), any increased
bias to look towards the snake may not be because ‘‘zookeeper’’ activates
snake representations (and all that they entail), but because the pre-existing
representation of the specific snake depicted in the scene is boosted on
hearing the semantically related ‘‘zookeeper’’ (cf. Huettig & Altmann,
2004)*in other words, without that pre-existing representation of the
specific snake, ‘‘zookeeper’’ may not activate the form of any specific animal,
but may instead activate semantic features associated with animals more
generally. If this is the case, and in the absence of a snake in the visual scene,
hearing ‘‘zookeeper’’ should not engender more looks towards a rope. Only
when the word ‘‘snake’’ is encountered should the interaction between the
scene representation of the rope and the conceptual representation evoked
by ‘‘snake’’ conspire to drive eye movements towards the rope.
One of the aims of the present research was to investigate precisely such
effects, and to explore how the concepts activated by spoken words and
visual objects might interact (as evidenced by eye movements) in differing
contexts. In Experiment 1, we measured eye movements to (a) the target
picture (e.g., a picture of a snake) when participants heard a sentence that
was contextually neutral up to the point when the target word was heard
(e.g., ‘‘In the beginning, the man watched closely, but then he looked at the
snake and realized that it was harmless’’); (b) the target picture (e.g., the
snake) when participants heard a sentence that was contextually biased
towards the target (e.g., ‘‘In the beginning, the zookeeper worried greatly, but
then he looked at the snake and realized that it was harmless’’); and (c) when
participants heard the same sentence as in the biasing condition (e.g., ‘‘In the
beginning, the zookeeper worried greatly, but then he looked at the snake . . .’’)
but the target picture (the snake) was replaced by a visual-shape competitor
(e.g., a picture of an electric cable). Aside from its theoretical relevance (see
above), this last condition has the added advantage relative to the Dahan
and Tanenhaus (2005) case that the presence of the cable in the absence of a
snake draws attention away from (or rather does not drive attention
towards) the physical similarity between cables and snakes. In principle,
the biasing context should not ‘‘favour’’ any of the objects depicted in the
scene (although this is an empirical issue we return to below). The neutral
condition was included in order to establish a baseline against which the
efficacy of the biasing contexts could be determined; the idea here was that
in the neutral context there would be no advantage in terms of attracting
looks of the target object until the corresponding target word was heard, but
in the biasing context (if the attempt to induce a bias was successful), an
advantage for the target object should be observed prior to the target word.
Our rationale for presenting the visual-shape competitor in a biasing context
was simply that we wanted to make it relatively unlikely that participants
would anticipate, prior to the target word, that the visual competitor would













































be the object of attention (even though it was not going to be referred to
directly).
Experiment 2 explored further the conditions under which visual form
effects occur. The existence of lexically ambiguous words such as ‘‘pen’’ (the
writing instrument or the enclosure) enables cases in which the target and
competitor are related to alternative meanings of the same phonological
word. A context that biases towards one interpretation of the homonym
(e.g., towards the enclosure meaning of ‘‘pen’’) might function in much the
same way as the zookeeper-snake contexts of Experiment 1. Thus, a sentence
fragment such as ‘‘the welder locked up carefully, but then he checked the
pen . . .’’ might cause increased looks towards a depiction of a pen-enclosure
even before the word ‘‘pen’’ is encountered. But at ‘‘pen’’, two distinct
representations become activated*one associated with the enclosure mean-
ing, and the other associated with the writing implement meaning. A variety
of studies (e.g., Swinney, 1979; see Simpson, 1994, for review) suggest that
the linguistic context will not prevent activation of the unintended meaning.
For polarized homonyms such as ‘‘pen’’, where one meaning (writing
implement) is more frequent than the other (enclosure), the more frequent
(or ‘‘dominant’’) meaning would normally become the most active, although
a context biasing the less frequent (‘‘subordinate’’) meaning may boost the
activation of the representation associated with this meaning and bring it up
to the level of the more dominant representation (cf. Duffy, Morris, &
Rayner, 1988). Thus, in a neutral linguistic context and a visual context
depicting both a pen-as-writing-implement and a pen-as-enclosure, we could
expect the word ‘‘pen’’ to engender more looks to the pen-as-writing-
implement than to the pen-as-enclosure, but more looks to the pen-as-
enclosure than to unrelated distractors (on the assumption that visual
contexts are no different in respect of their influence on lexical ambiguity
than linguistic contexts). In a biasing linguistic context (biasing towards the
subordinate meaning), we might expect that by the time ‘‘pen’’ is heard, there
would be more looks towards the pen-as-enclosure, but that at or soon after
‘‘pen’’, looks towards the pen-as-writing-implement would rise rapidly. But
what if the pen-as-writing-implement were replaced with a visual competitor,
i.e., an object that shared its visual form? Would looks towards a sewing
needle rise in this same way?
On the one hand, if looks towards the sewing needle did rise on hearing
‘‘pen’’, this would suggest that visual attention was driven by the partial
featural match between the episodic representation of the needle (including
its visual form) and the conceptual representation (including prototypical
visual form) associated with one of the meanings of the lexically ambiguous
‘‘pen’’.
On the other hand, the depicted sewing needle is not a visual competitor
for the contextually intended pen-as-enclosure (in the way that the cable is a













































visual competitor in Experiment 1 for the contextually intended snake)*it is
a visual competitor for the contextually unintended pen-as-writing-imple-
ment. Moreover, the representation of the intended pen-as-enclosure may be
activated well before the onset of the word ‘‘pen’’. Thus, whereas Experiment
1 investigates looks towards an object (the cable) sharing visual form with
the visual representation associated with a contextually appropriate concept
(activated at the word ‘‘snake’’), Experiment 2 investigates looks towards an
object (the needle) sharing visual form with the visual representation
associated with a contextually less relevant concept (activated at the word
‘‘pen’’). Thus, if we found that there were no more looks towards the sewing
needle than towards the distractors, we would have to conclude that visual
competitor effects are modulated by the contextual appropriateness of the
target concept (i.e., the concept that conveys prototypical form information
shared with the actual form of the visual competitor).
In sum, the primary aim of the present research was to investigate how
the concepts activated by spoken words and visual objects interact in
differing contexts and how this may be mediated by a match in visual form.
Participants saw visual displays containing four spatially distinct objects and
heard spoken sentences while their eye movements were recorded. In
Experiment 1, the sentences were neutral or were biased such that they
contextually biased (‘‘zookeeper worried greatly’’) a certain target word (e.g.,
‘‘snake’’). The visual display included the target object (the snake) or an
object with a similar visual form (an electric cable). We investigated whether
on hearing ‘‘snake’’ participants would shift overt attention to an object with
a similar visual form (the cable; cf. Dahan & Tanenhaus, 2005). Of particular
interest though was whether participants would look at the cable in the
snake-biasing context even before hearing ‘‘snake’’. In other words, we are
asking whether the visual form effect is lexically driven or whether it is
modulated by linguistic context. In Experiment 2, we further explored this
issue and also used neutral and biasing sentences; the target words, however,
were homonyms, and the contextual bias was towards the subordinate
meaning of the homonym. The visual display included a depiction of the
subordinate meaning and a depiction of the dominant meaning or an object
with a similar visual form as the dominant meaning of the homonym. Of
particular interest was whether and when participants would look at the
visual competitor of the contextually inappropriate dominant meaning.
Thus, the present research investigates the conditions under which attention
is guided by a visual match between spoken words and concurrent visual
objects. We examine whether this visual match is primarily based on lexical
input or whether it is modulated by the appropriateness of the linguistic
context, and we explore whether anticipatory eye movements can be
modulated by a visual match or are based primarily on a semantic match.















































Materials. On each trial in the experiment, participants were presented
with a visual display containing line drawings of four spatially distinct
objects together with a spoken sentence. Throughout the experiment the
participant’s direction of eye gaze was measured. Two sets of 21 visual
stimuli were created. In one set (the target set, see Figure 1a), each display
contained a target picture of a named item, e.g., the picture of a snake,
together with three distractor pictures of objects completely unrelated to any
of the spoken words. Importantly, all of these distractors were visually
different to the target word’s referent. In the second set of stimuli (the
competitor set), the target picture was replaced with a picture depicting an
object of a similar shape to that of the target’s referent (e.g., the picture of a
cable, see Figure 1b).
The visual stimuli were selected from commercially available ClipArt
packages and presented in greyscale format. The 21 target-competitor pairs
were: anchor/arrow, apple/moon, banana/sword, bell/hat, button/coin,
candle/tube, cigar/carrot, chimney/rocket, dice/ice cubes, football/planet,
globe/orange, horseshoe/magnet, lighthouse/flask, microphone/cone, mirror/
frame, pencil/column, plate/wheel, racket/saucepan, scissors/chopsticks,
snake/cable, and wheelbarrow/sledge. Naming agreement on all pictures
was collected from 46 participants. Responses were coded as intended,
unintended, or ‘‘no response’’. Responses were coded as intended only when
they exactly matched the intended name (e.g., ‘‘bear’’ was coded as valid but
not ‘‘Grizzly bear’’). ‘‘No response’’ was given in only 0.10% of trials. The
intended response was given in 75% of trials. Unintended names were largely
due to choosing a near-synonym (‘‘lead’’ instead of ‘‘cable’’ or ‘‘boat’’
instead of ‘‘submarine’’). Unintended names due to misidentification
occurred on only 1.97% of trials.
There were three experimental conditions: In the neutral condition, target
set pictures were each paired with a neutral sentence such that the sentence
could not induce any bias to look towards any particular picture in the
display, e.g., ‘‘In the beginning, the man watched closely, but then he looked at
the snake and realized that it was harmless.’’ In the biasing condition,
different sentences from the target set were each paired with a sentence that
was constructed so as to bias looks towards the designated target picture
(e.g., the snake): ‘‘In the beginning, the zookeeper worried greatly, but then he
looked at the snake and realized that it was harmless.’’ The neutral sentences
were included as baseline.
The biasing condition was included in order to investigate the effect of the
sentential bias on looks to the target picture (the snake). However, the verb













































phrase (e.g., ‘‘looked at’’) preceding the target word (e.g., ‘‘snake’’) was
neutral with respect to the depicted objects. This was to avoid any possible
confounding effects that a biasing verb may have had on participants’ eye
movements.
In each of these first two conditions, the visual display contained the
target picture (e.g., a snake). However, in the third and final ‘‘shape
competitor’’ condition, the same sentences as in the biasing condition were
Figure 1. Examples of visual displays used in Experiment 1: (a) In the neutral and biasing
conditions, and (b) in the competitor condition. In (a) the target is snake, and in both cases the
pictures of the rug, the pillow, and the barrel are distractors; in (b) the cable is the visual-shape
competitor.













































paired with the visual competitor set. For these stimuli, the visual target (e.g.,
the snake) was replaced with a visual competitor (a cable). These competitors
were chosen so as to be semantically unrelated to the spoken target word
(i.e., ‘‘snake’’). Therefore, the sentence could not induce any bias towards
any particular picture. The shape competitor was presented in the biasing
context in order to make it even more unlikely that participants would
anticipate, prior to the target word, that the shape competitor was the
designated special picture.
Preliminary norming study*shape similarity
In a preliminary norming study 12 participants provided relevant ratings.
Participants were presented with the written target word (e.g., snake)
together with pictures used in the later visual world study, and they were
asked to judge how similar the typical physical shape of the target referent
was to the physical shape of the referents of the depicted objects.
Participants were asked to judge the shape similarity on a scale from 0 to
10 (zero representing ‘‘absolutely no similarity in physical shape’’, 10
representing ‘‘identical in physical shape’’).
The mean rating for the shape competitors was 7.1 (SD1.8) and 1.4
(SD0.7) for the distractors. These differences in the shape similarity
judgements between the shape competitors and the distractors were highly
significant, F1(1, 11)268.89, MSE0.07, pB.01; F2(1, 20)200.35,
MSE0.17, pB.001. Therefore, the competitor pictures were judged to
be significantly more similar in physical shape to the target referents than to
those of the distractor pictures.
Visual world study
Participants. 48 participants from the University of York student
community took part in this study. All were native speakers of British
English and had either normal or corrected-to-normal vision.
Design. Each participant was presented with 21 experimental trials
together with 19 additional filler items. On the filler trials, one of the pictures
was named in the spoken sentence. Thus, 82% of the 40 trials included a
named picture; hence across trials participants may well have built up an
expectation that one of the pictures would be named.
Materials were counterbalanced across the experimental trials for three
groups of participants. Each participant received seven trials in the neutral,
biasing, and shape competitor conditions. The same 19 fillers were used for
all of the three groups. Trials were presented in the same random order to
each participant.













































Procedure. Each participant was tested individually and each was seated
at a comfortable distance (with their eyes between 20 and 25 inches from the
display) in front of the computer display. Throughout testing the participant
wore an SMI EyeLink head-mounted eyetracker. Although viewing was
binocular, the eyetracker sampled at 250 Hz from the right eye only.
Participants were told that they should listen to the sentences carefully, that
they could look at whatever they wanted to, but that they were not to take
their eyes off the screen throughout the experiment. In other words, their
only task was to listen to the spoken language while looking at the screen (cf.
Altmann, 2004; Huettig & Altmann, 2005).
The onset of the presentation of the visual stimulus occurred 1 s before
the onset of the spoken stimulus. The onset of the acoustic target word
occurred on average 4 s after the onset of the spoken sentence, and thus the
acoustic target word started to unfold on average 5 s after the onset of the
visual stimulus. Between adjacent trials participants were shown a single dot
located in the centre of the screen, which they were asked to fixate prior to a
fixation cross appearing in this position (this procedure allowed the
eyetracker to correct for drift). Participants would then press a response
button for the next presentation. The termination of trials was preset and
controlled by the experimental program, and thus participants could not
terminate trials by themselves. The trial was automatically terminated after
9 s, which, typically, left 2 s after the end of the sentence. After every fourth
trial, the eyetracker was recalibrated using a nine-point fixation stimulus.
The EyeLink software automatically validates calibrations, and the experi-
menter, could, if required, repeat the calibration process if the validation was
poor. Calibration took typically about 20 s. The entire experiment lasted
approximately 20 min.
Data analyses. We examined certain time points as being of prime
importance. The critical time points were: (a) at the onset of the critical word
(henceforth the onset time point); (b) at its offset, (henceforth the offset time
point); and (c) at 200 ms after its offset (henceforth the 200time point).
Looks at the onset of the critical word are of interest in order to assess
whether any biases in attention to any type of picture existed before
information from the critical word became available. Looks at the offset time
point reveal whether the unfolding of the critical word resulted in changes in
overt attention. Given that it takes some time to program and initiate a
saccadic eye movement (with estimates varying between 100 ms and 180 ms;
see Altmann & Kamide, 2004, for review), fixation probabilities were also
examined 200 ms after the offset of the acoustic target word (cf. Dahan &
Tanenhaus, 2005). Eye movements initiated between 130 ms and 200 ms
post-offset may reflect a ‘‘trigger’’ to move the eyes (and where to move
them) that was received by the saccadic control mechanism post-offset, but it













































is likely that the cognitive processes that caused that trigger took place at
around word offset, if not just before. Despite this uncertainty, we can be
sure that any divergence in the patterns emerging 200 ms post-offset are most
likely due to later cognitive initiation than divergence emerging by the offset
itself.
Our primary interest was whether more overt attention occurred to the
critical pictures than to the unrelated distractors. To examine this, difference
scores were calculated by subtracting the proportion of fixations to the
distractor from the proportion of fixations to the target, and by subtracting
the proportion of fixations to the distractors from the proportion of
fixations to the competitor. Proportion of fixations to the distractors was
averaged across the three distractor pictures. Difference scores reveal both
the magnitude and direction of any tendency to favour one type of picture
over another. Any positive difference reveals a bias of looks towards the
critical picture, a negative difference reveals a bias to look towards the
distractors, and difference scores close to zero reveal neither bias. We report
below difference scores and their 95% confidence intervals (hence permitting
statistical inference regarding the relationship between looks to the target/
competitor object and looks to the distractors).
Results
At the onset time point there were no significant differences between looks to
the target pictures and looks to the distractors in the neutral condition
(mean difference score: 3.75; by participants, p.1, upper 95% confidence
interval (CI): 10.25, lower 95% CI: 2.75; by items, p.1, upper 95% CI:
10.78, lower 95% CI: 3.73) and between looks to the shape competitors
and looks to the distractors in the competitor condition (mean difference
score: 1.38; by participants, p.1, upper 95% CI: 6.79, lower 95% CI: 
4.04; by items, p.1, upper 95% CI: 9.29, lower 95% CI: 7.01). Therefore,
there were no reliable biases in attention to any type of picture at the onset of
the target word in the neutral and competitor conditions.2 Table 1 reveals
that there was a higher probability to fixate the target in the biasing
condition at the onset of the critical word. This reliable bias (mean difference
score: 20.92; by participants, pB.001, upper 95% CI: 28.92, lower 95% CI:
12.92; by items, pB.001, upper 95% CI: 28.26, lower 95% CI: 13.26) was
2 Participants did not show significantly increased fixations to the visual competitor (e.g., the
cable) at any point in time before hearing the target word. Note that Table 1 also shows the
probability to fixate the types of pictures at the offset of the noun (‘‘man’’ or ‘‘zookeeper’’), the
verb (‘‘watched’’ or ‘‘worried’’), and the adverb (‘‘closely’’ or ‘‘greatly’’) in the neutral or biasing
phrases preceding the target word.













































expected on the grounds that the prior biasing context ought to induce looks
towards the relevant picture.
At the offset time point there were reliable biases in overt attention to the
critical pictures in the neutral (mean difference score: 35.17; by participants,
pB.001, upper 95% CI: 42.89, lower 95% CI: 27.44; by items, pB.001,
upper 95% CI: 45.28, lower 95% CI: 24.91), biasing (mean difference score:
38.48; by participants, pB.001, upper 95% CI: 46.40, lower 95% CI:
30.52; by items, pB.001, upper 95% CI: 47.09, lower 95% CI: 29.86),
and competitor conditions (mean difference score: 10.95; by participants,
pB.01, upper 95% CI: 17.50, lower 95% CI: 4.71; by items, pB.05, upper
95% CI: 20.43, lower 95% CI: 1.48). Given the time it takes to initiate and
program a saccadic eye movement means that the shifts towards the visual-
shape competitors were initiated well before word offset. These effects are
maintained (and indeed magnified) at the 200 time point (see Table 1).
Finally, to examine in more detail the properties of this visual competitor
effect, we correlated the eye movement data with the visual similarity ratings
described earlier (i.e., the similarity of the depicted cable to the shape
associated with the printed word ‘‘cable’’). There was no statistically
significant correlation between these ratings and the probability of fixating
the visual competitor at either word offset or at word offset200 ms.
However, for saccades launched towards the competitor during the acoustic
lifetime of the target word (i.e., between word onset and word offset), the
TABLE 1
Averaged probabilities of fixating a type of picture in Experiment 1
Condition
Neutral Biasing Competitor
Type of picture Target Distractor Target Distractor
Shape
competitor Distractor
p(fix) at prior noun (‘‘man’’ or
‘‘zookeeper’’) offset
0.19 0.26 0.24 0.25 0.23 0.25
p(fix) at prior verb (‘‘watched’’ or
‘‘worried’’) offset
0.21 0.26 0.34 0.21 0.26 0.24
p(fix) at prior adverb (‘‘closely’’ or
‘‘greatly’’) offset
0.21 0.25 0.38*** 0.20 0.25 0.25
p(fix) at target (‘‘snake’’) onset 0.27 0.24 0.39*** 0.19 0.25 0.24
p(fix) at target offset 0.50*** 0.15 0.52*** 0.14 0.33** 0.22
p(fix) at target offset200 ms 0.68*** 0.09 0.62*** 0.10 0.48*** 0.17
*Difference score to distractors pB.05 for participants.
**Difference score to distractors pB.01 for participants.
***Difference score to distractors pB.001 for participants.













































subsequent fixation durations correlated significantly with the visual
similarity ratings (Pearson correlation, two-tailed, r.55, p.01).
Supplementary graphical presentation. In addition to the statistical
analyses, we plotted time-course graphs that illustrate the fixation prob-
abilities to the various types of pictures over time. Note that the data are
plotted in this way to aid visualization of participant performance*
statistical analyses were carried out on the absolute proportion of trials on
which the object of interest was fixated at a particular time point, irrespective
of when that fixation was initiated. Figure 2 shows a time-course graph that
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target offset + 200 ms
Figure 2. Proportion of trials with a fixation on the target in the neutral condition and the biasing
condition, and on the shape competitor in the competitor condition (and averaged distractors of each
condition). The curves are synchronized to the acoustic onset of the target word, and the x-axis shows
time in milliseconds from this onset. The calculation excluded all movements prior to the acoustic
onset, and thus negative values reflect moves away from objects that were already fixated at this onset;
in effect, each data point reflects the proportion of trials with a fixation at that moment in time minus
the proportion of trials with a fixation at the acoustic onset of the target word.













































various types of pictures over the course of the average trial. In computing
these values, each visual display was treated as being composed of four
(virtual) quadrants, and eye position was categorized according to the
currently fixated quadrant. p(targ) refers to the probability of fixating the
target at a particular time point, p(comp) in this case refers to the probability
of fixating the visual-shape competitor, and p(dist) refers to the averaged
probability of fixating any distractor. The plots show the time course of
fixations in the neutral, biasing, and competitor conditions, and individual
curves relate to looks to the target in the neutral and in the biasing
conditions, looks to the competitor in the competitor condition, and looks
to the distractors in all of these conditions. Plots start from the acoustic
onset of the critical word and cover the ensuing 1000 ms. This time region is
of interest because it reflects the change in fixations that occurred both
during and after the acoustic unfolding of the critical word.
In plotting the data, we follow Huettig and Altmann (2005) and plot only
those data pertaining to fixations whose initial onsets occurred at or after the
acoustic onset of the target word. Thus, the plots indicate change in fixation
probability, with positive values indicating a net increase in the probability of
fixation relative to the probability at word onset, and negative values
indicating a net decrease in the probability of fixation relative to that
probability. Consequently, the plots do not indicate any differences in the
probabilities of fixation that might have existed at target word onset. These
values are reported in Table 1.
The graphs in Figure 2 illustrate that participants shifted their overt
attention to the target (e.g., snake) and the competitor (e.g., cable) during the
critical time period very rapidly. The fixation probability curves shown
suggest that p(comp), in the competitor condition, diverges from p(dist) very
early. In other words, there was no observable delay in the time course of the
shifts in overt attention to the shape competitor objects.
Discussion
To summarize the data: In the neutral condition no differences in overt
attention to any particular type of picture were observed at the acoustic onset
of the target word. At the later time points, however, attention was directed
towards the corresponding target pictures. In contrast, in the biasing
condition, the biasing sentential context gave rise to a substantial bias to
look towards the target picture even before the target word had been
presented. This bias was present in the data for all three time points. Finally,
in the competitor condition, no differences in overt attention were found at
the onset time point nor at earlier time points, but by the offset of the target
word, there were reliable biases in overt attention towards the competitor













































object (e.g., the cable), and the time spent fixating that object correlated
significantly with the visual similarity ratings from the preliminary norming
study. In other words, there was a robust shift in overt attention towards a
picture of a shape competitor to the named target even though the competitor
and target were conceptually unrelated. Importantly, however, there was no
such shift towards the visual competitor before the target word acoustically
unfolded.
The data from Experiment 1 reveal that when people listen to spoken
language and are simultaneously presented with a number of visual objects,
they direct spurious eye movements to objects that share only a visual-shape
relationship with the concept activated by the spoken target word. This
relationship is established very rapidly during spoken word processing*well
before word offset*and appears to be one of the determinants of the time
spent fixating the visually similar object. We return to the implication of
these findings in the General Discussion.
The finding that sentential context biasing towards the target (snake)
resulted in increased attention towards the target object (snake) even before
the target word was heard is consistent with previous visual world findings
that the mapping process between spoken language and visual objects occurs
(at least) partially on the level of semantic/conceptual representations (cf.
Cooper, 1974; Huettig & Altmann, 2005; see also the literature on
anticipatory eye movements, e.g., Altmann & Kamide, 1999). Critically,
there was no equivalent tendency to attend preferentially to the competitor
object (the cable) in the biasing context. Only when the word ‘‘snake’’ was
heard did attention towards this object increase. Consequently, whatever
causes increased attention in the biasing condition towards the snake after
hearing ‘‘zookeeper’’, but before hearing ‘‘snake’’, does not cause increased
attention towards the cable in the competitor condition. The data thus rule
out an explanation of this pretarget word bias in terms of ‘‘zookeeper’’
causing the activation of shape representations associated with snakes which
are then matched against visual form information extracted directly from the
image. Such an account would predict increased looks towards objects with
similar visual forms, and no such increase was observed. We conclude that
the bias to look towards the snake in the biasing condition is due to the
existence of an episodic representation of the depicted snake that, being
conceptually related to those conceptual representations associated with
zookeepers, receives additional activation when ‘‘zookeeper’’ is en-
countered*thereby ‘‘attracting’’ attention back towards the snake.
These and prior data indicate that shifts in overt visual attention occur
towards items related to words in the language when there is some featural
match between the target specification accessed by the spoken word and the
properties of the objects in the visual display. The shift, during the word
‘‘snake’’, towards the picture of the snake in the neutral and biasing













































conditions of Experiment 1 reflects a full (or relatively full) featural match
between the episodic representation of the snake and the target conceptual
representation activated on hearing ‘‘snake’’. The shift towards the cable
reflects a partial featural match between the episodic representation of the
cable (including its visual form) and the target conceptual representation
(including prototypical visual form) activated by ‘‘snake’’. We note that this
partial featural match may, or may not, occur in the context of a phonological
mismatch. If the episodic representation of the cable does not include its
phonological form (i.e., the phonology associated with the word ‘‘cable’’),
then there is no phonological mismatch against ‘‘snake’’. Consequently, the
data from Experiment 1 do not speak directly to how phonology might
modulate the activation of the episodic representations that arise through
inspection of the visual scene. There are, however, cases in which phonology
might play a very crucial role in creating competitor objects (i.e., objects other
than the intended target to which attention might be directed), and these cases
are explored in Experiment 2. This second experiment further explores the
conditions under which visual competitor effects arise, and asks, specifically,
whether the contextual appropriateness of the target concept (cf. the snake
concept in Experiment 1) modulates looks towards the visual competitor (cf.
the cable). In effect, we ask how robust visual competitor effects are when
there exists in the visual scene a contextually more appropriate object to which
visual attention can be directed as the language unfolds.
EXPERIMENT 2
Experiment 2 was a variant of Experiment 1*in the neutral and biasing
conditions, each display depicted an object related to the dominant meaning
of the target word (a writing pen), an object related to the subordinate
meaning of the target word (a cage-like enclosure), and two unrelated
distractors. The biasing condition biased towards the pen-as-enclosure
meaning. In the competitor conditions, the object related to the dominant
meaning (the writing pen) was replaced by an object (a sewing needle) with
similar visual shape as that associated with the dominant meaning. The
context biased towards the pen-as-enclosure meaning.
Method
Materials. There were three experimental conditions: a neutral condition,
a biasing condition, and a competitor condition. The design of the neutral and
biasing conditions was as in Experiment 1. Figure 3a provides an example of
the sort of display used in these conditions. Similar displays were used in the
competitor condition (see Figure 3b), but the object corresponding to
the dominant meaning (e.g., pen-writing implement) was replaced with the













































referent of a shape competitor (i.e., a needle). The visual stimuli were selected
from commercially available ClipArt packages and presented in greyscale
format. The selected shape competitors were jar (for battery-radio), robot (for
boxer-fighter), pear (for bulb-light), teddy (for calf-cow), snowflake
(for diamond-jewel), stage (for film-movie), planet (for heart-organ), torch
(for horn-loud), picture (for letter-mail), needle (for pen-writing implement),
hair (for plant-flower), ladle (for spade-shovel), bridge (for table-furniture),
and handkerchief (for toast-bread). Naming agreement on all pictures was
Figure 3. Examples of visual displays used in Experiment 2: (a) In the neutral and biasing
conditions, and (b) in the competitor condition. Here the target homonym is ‘‘pen’’, and in both cases
the pictures of the bicycle and bucket are distractors and the cage is the subordinate referent. In (a) the
dominant referent is the pen-writing implement, and in (b) the needle is the competitor.













































collected from 69 participants. Responses were coded as intended, unin-
tended, or ‘‘no response’’. Responses were coded as intended only when they
exactly matched the intended name (e.g., ‘‘pen’’ was coded as valid but not
‘‘fountain pen’’). ‘‘No response’’ was given in only 0.31% of trials. The
intended response was given in 64% of trials. Unintended names were largely
due to choosing a near-synonym (‘‘mug’’ instead of ‘‘cup’’, or ‘‘Jupiter’’
instead of ‘‘planet’’). Unintended names due to misidentification (‘‘ball’’
instead of ‘‘planet’’) occurred on only 2.92% of trials.
The spoken sentence in the neutral condition did not bias either meaning
of the homonym (up to the point when the homonym was heard): ‘‘First, the
man got ready quickly, but then he checked the pen and suspected that it was
damaged.’’ The sentences in the biasing and competitor conditions were
identical, but were designed to bias interpretation towards the subordinate
meaning: ‘‘First, the welder locked up carefully, but then he checked the pen
and suspected that it was damaged.’’ These sentences were identical to those
used in the neutral condition except for the biasing phrase (‘‘welder locked up
carefully’’), which was replaced with a neutral phrase in the neutral
condition (‘‘man got ready quickly’’). In the neutral and in the biasing
condition, participants heard ‘‘pen’’ and saw a pen-writing implement, a pen-
cage, and two unrelated distractors. In the competitor condition, partici-
pants heard ‘‘pen’’ and saw a needle (the shape competitor), a pen-cage, and
two unrelated distractors. The pen-writing implement was not depicted in
the competitor condition.
Preliminary norming studies
Norming study 1*rating word association. A word association task was
carried out to establish the relative frequencies of the meanings of the
homonyms. Participants were simply asked to write down the first word they
thought of when reading each of the 15 homonyms. The relative meaning
frequency was determined by the frequency of all responses across all
participants (e.g., Nelson, McEvoy, Walling, & Wheeler, 1980; Twilley,
Dixon, Taylor, & Clark, 1994). The assumption here is that participants
produce associates to the lexical items (e.g., the response ‘‘money’’ after
reading the word ‘‘bank’’) in proportion to the availability of the different
meanings from the surface form of the word.
Twenty participants from the University of York student community took
part. The selected homonyms and their relative meaning frequencies
according to this norming study, the Twilley et al. (1994) norms, and the
Nelson et al. (1980) norms are included in Table 2. Visual inspection of
the data reveals that the homonyms were polarized because there was a large
difference in the ratings for the dominant and subordinate meanings across
all of the norms.













































Norming study 2*rating strength of sentential context. A second
norming study was also run to ensure that the linguistic contexts were
appropriate. A different set of 24 participants from the University of York
student community took part. Now participants were provided with a
randomized list of the written experimental sentences up to the point where
the critical word (the homonym) occurred in the neutral (e.g., ‘‘First, the
man got ready quickly, but then he checked the pen . . .’’) and the biasing/
competitor (e.g., ‘‘First, the welder locked up carefully, but then he checked
the pen . . .’’) conditions.
They were asked to rate the particular strength and meaning bias of each
sentence on a scale from 5 to 5, where 5 represented a strong bias
towards the subordinate meaning (e.g., pen-cage),5 a strong bias towards
the dominant meaning (e.g., pen-writing implement), and zero represented
neither bias. They were provided with an associate word of each meaning of
the homonym to indicate which meaning was intended.
The average rating for the sentences in the biasing condition was 3.48
(SD0.77; upper bound of 95% confidence interval of mean: 3.04, lower
bound: 3.90). Therefore the sentences in the biasing condition were
biasing the subordinate meaning.
The average rating for the sentences in the neutral condition was 0.83
(SD0.78; upper bound of 95% confidence interval of mean: 1.27, lower
TABLE 2
The relative frequencies of the meanings of the homonyms used in Experiment 2
according to the present norming study, the Twilley et al. (1994) norms, and the
Nelson et al. (1980) norms
Current norms Twilley norms Nelson norms
Homonym Dominant Subordinate Dominant Subordinate Dominant Subordinate
Battery .90 (car) .10 (hen) .84 0 * *
Boxer .85 (fighter) .10 (dog) * * * *
Bulb .95 (light) .05 (garden) .86 .11 * *
Calf .85 (cow) .15 (leg) .81 .11 * *
Diamond 1.0 (jewel) 0 (card) .89 .01 .93 0
Film .65 (movie) .25 (photo) .90 .02 * *
Heart .95 (lungs) .05 (card) * * * *
Horn .90 (car) .05 (cow) .77 .17 .91 .04
Letter .95 (mail) .05 (alphabet) .68 .07 .91 .04
Pen 1.0 (pencil) 0 (pig) .91 .04 .85 .09
Plant .95 (green) .05 (power) .93 .02 * *
Spade .85 (garden) .15 (card) .66 .27 .48 .48
Table 1.0 (chair) 0 (figure) * * * *
Temple .85 (god) .15 (head) .84 .02 .62 .31
Toast .95 (jam) .05 (wine) .88 .09 .89 .09
Average .91 .08 .83 .08 .80 .15













































bound: 0.40). Therefore, there was a slight bias towards the dominant
meaning for the sentences in the neutral condition. Indeed, it may be inherent
in the strong frequency dominance effect that participants judge even
ostensibly neutral sentences to be biasing slightly towards the dominant
meaning.
Norming study 3*rating shape similarity. In order to determine the
similarity of the shape of the dominant referent with the depicted objects, a
final norming study was conducted. Ten participants were presented with the
written (dominant meaning) of the homonym (e.g., pen-writing implement)
and the pictures used in the corresponding displays. Participants were asked
to judge how similar the typical physical shape of the dominant referent was
to the physical shape of the depicted objects on a scale from 0 to 10 (0
representing: ‘‘absolutely no similarity in physical shape’’, 10 representing:
‘‘identical in physical shape’’).
The mean for the shape competitors was 4.63 (SD2.41), 0.71 (SD0.55)
for the distractors, and 1.94 (SD2.42) for the subordinate referents. These
differences in the shape similarity judgementswere statistically significant, F(2,
26)14.33, MSE3.92, pB.001. Planned comparison revealed that there
were no statistically significant differences between the distractors and the
subordinate referents, F(1, 13)3.59, MSE2.94, p.05. However, there
were statistically significant differences between the shape competitors and the
subordinate referents, F(1, 13)9.26, MSE5.45, pB.01, and the shape
competitors and the distractors, F(1, 13)32.0, MSE3.35, pB.01. There-
fore, the competitor pictures were judged to be significantly more similar in
physical shape to the dominant meaning than to the other pictures.
Visual world study
Design. There were 15 experimental trials and 25 filler trials. A within-
participants counterbalanced design was used across the three conditions. In
counterbalancing Group A, each participant received five items in the
neutral condition, five items in the biasing condition, and five items in the
competitor condition. Assignment of these sets of five items were counter-
balanced over two other groups (Groups B and C). The same 25 fillers were
used for all of the three groups. The trials were presented in fixed random
order as in the previous experiment.
Participants. Forty-eight participants from the University of York student
community took part in this study. All were native speakers of British English
and had either uncorrected vision or wore soft contact lenses or glasses.
Procedure. The procedure was the same as in Experiment 1.














































The results were analysed in the same way as in the previous experiment.
Neutral condition. Table 3 summarizes the fixation proportions of the
current data. As summarized in Table 3, at the acoustic onset of the critical
word, the probability to fixate the dominant referent, henceforth p(fix dom),
the probability to fixate the subordinate referent, henceforth p(fix sub), and
the probability to fixate the unrelated distractors, henceforth p(fix dist) were
similar. There were no significant differences between looks to the dominant
referents and looks to the distractors (mean difference score: 1.88; by
participants, p.1, upper 95% CI: 10.04, lower 95% CI: 6.29; by items,
p.1, upper 95% CI: 10.75, lower 95% CI: 6.62) and between looks to the
subordinate referents and looks to the distractors (mean difference score:
5.63; by participants, p.1, upper 95% CI: 14.03, lower 95% CI: 2.71; by
items, p.1, upper 95% CI: 14.34, lower 95% CI: 3.14). In other words,
all types of pictures were treated as being equal in terms of the allocation of
attention at this point.
At the acoustic offset of the target word, there were statistically significant
biases in overt attention to the dominant referent (mean difference score:
18.13; by participants, pB.001, upper 95% CI: 26.90, lower 95% CI: 9.35; by
items, pB.05, upper 95% CI: 32.38, lower 95% CI: 4.01), and to the
subordinate referent (mean difference score: 9.79; by participants, pB.01,
upper 95% CI: 18.23, lower 95% CI: 1.35; by items, pB.05, upper 95% CI:
18.66, lower 95% CI: 1.07). At the acoustic offset200 ms, statistically
reliable biases in overt attention were observed to the dominant referent
(mean difference score: 33.33; by participants, pB.001, upper 95% CI: 42.33,
lower 95% CI: 24.34; by items, pB.001, upper 95% CI: 47.33, lower 95% CI:
19.20), and to the subordinate referent (mean difference score: 19.17; by
participants, pB.001, upper 95% CI: 26.55, lower 95% CI: 11.79; by items,
pB.01, upper 95% CI: 29.20, lower 95% CI: 6.70).
Biasing condition. Here the sentential context was designed to bias the
subordinate referent of the homonym. Table 3 summarizes the fixation
proportions. At the acoustic onset of the target word, there was no statistical
difference in overt attention to the dominant referent relative to the distractors
(mean difference score: 2.71; by participants, p.1, upper 95% CI: 9.01, lower
95% CI: 3.60; by items, p.1, upper 95% CI: 13.78, lower 95% CI: 8.32).
However, there was a reliable bias in overt attention towards the subordinate
referent relative to the distractors (mean difference score: 28.52; by
participants, pB.001, upper 95% CI: 38.58, lower 95% CI: 18.50; by items,
pB.001, upper 95% CI: 36.79, lower 95% CI: 20.41). The difference in overt
attention towards the subordinate referent relative to that towards the













































distractors is maintained at the later time points. At the offset of the target
word there was more overt attention to the (contextually inappropriate)
dominant referent relative to the unrelated distractors (mean difference score:
9.79; by participants, pB.01, upper 95% CI: 16.09, lower 95% CI: 3.50; by
items, p.07, upper 95% CI: 20.55, lower 95% CI: 1.08). Statistically
reliable biases were found at the later offset200 ms time point (mean
difference score: 17.91; by participants, pB.001, upper 95% CI: 24.85, lower
95% CI: 10.98; by items, pB.01, upper 95% CI: 29.16, lower 95% CI: 6.70).
Thus, the sentential context biasing the subordinate meaning did not prevent
eventual increased overt attention to the dominant referent.
Competitor condition. In this condition, the sentential context was
designed to bias the subordinate meaning of the homonym. Importantly,
however, the visual referent of the dominant meaning (e.g., pen-writing
implement) was replaced with a shape competitor (e.g., a needle). Table 3
summarizes the fixation proportions. There was a strong bias in atten-
tion towards the subordinate referent (mean difference score: 34.17; by
TABLE 3
The probability of fixating each type of picture at the acoustic onset, offset, and 200 ms
after the offset of the target words (averaged for participants and items) in the neutral,
biasing, and competitor conditions in Experiment 2
Type of picture
Time point Dominant referent Subordinate referent Distractor
Neutral condition
p(fix) at onset 0.24 0.28 0.22
p(fix) at offset 0.34*** 0.26** 0.16
p(fix) at offset200 msa 0.43*** 0.29*** 0.10
Biasing condition
p(fix) at onset 0.19 0.45*** 0.16
p(fix) at offset 0.23** 0.45*** 0.13
p(fix) at offset200 msa 0.27*** 0.46*** 0.09
Shape competitor Subordinate referent Distractor
Competitor condition
p(fix) at onset 0.20 0.49*** 0.15
p(fix) at offset 0.22** 0.50*** 0.13
p(fix) at offset200 ms 0.26*** 0.50*** 0.10
The biasing context refers to sentences that biased the subordinate meaning of the homonym.
*Difference score to distractors pB.05 for participants.
**Difference score to distractors pB.01 for participants.
***Difference score to distractors pB.001 for participants.













































participants, pB.001, upper 95% CI: 42.95, lower 95% CI: 25.39; by items, pB
.001, upper 95% CI: 45.45, lower 95% CI: 22.82), but no significant bias to
fixate the competitor at the onset time point (mean difference score: 5.83; by
participants, p.05, upper 95% CI: 12.25, lower 95% CI: 0.59; by items,
p.1, upper 95% CI: 13.83, lower 95% CI: 2.09). The difference in overt
attention towards the subordinate referent relative to that towards the
distractors is maintained at the later time points. There was a significant
bias in attention towards the shape competitor, relative to the distractors, at
word offset (mean difference score: 8.96; by participants, pB.05, upper 95%
CI: 16.77, lower 95% CI: 1.14; by items, pB.05, upper 95% CI: 16.89, lower
95% CI: 1.24). More overt attention was also directed towards the shape
competitor relative to the unrelated distractors at the offset200 ms (mean
difference score: 15.63; by participants, pB.001, upper 95% CI: 22.45, lower
95% CI: 8.80; by items, pB.05, upper 95% CI: 27.62, lower 95% CI: 3.84) time
points.
Supplementary graphical presentation. Figure 4a shows the time-course
graph in the neutral condition. As before, the time-course graph shows the
change in fixation probabilities relative to the probability of fixation at target
word onset*that is, only fixations initiated from that point onwards are
included in the graph. p(fix sub) stayed at a similar level throughout the total
time window. However, performance associated with the subordinate
referent is unlike that associated with an unrelated distractor. It can be
seen that there was a gradual decrease in p(fix dist) during the acoustic
lifetime of the critical word. If the subordinate referent had been treated like
an unrelated distractor, then a similar effect would have been expected. In
other words, although the fixation probabilities to the subordinate referent
did not rise in this condition, it was nevertheless privileged in terms of
allocation of attention compared to the unrelated distractors. The fact that
the p(fix sub) did not show an increase of greater magnitude is most likely
due to the fact that the dominant referent attracted the most attention. In
other words, the subordinate referent was competing for attention with the
dominant referent. This shows very clearly how the probability to fixate a
particular visual referent is necessarily determined (in part) by what other
referents compete for attention in the same display.
Figure 4b shows the change in fixation probabilities relative to the
probability of fixation at target word onset in the biasing condition. Figure
4c shows this time course in the competitor condition. From Figure 4c one can
see that looks towards the visual form competitor (e.g., the needle) do rise
relative to looks towards the distractors. Recall that the graph takes into
account (and eliminates) the bias to fixate the cage at the onset of the target
word. Thus, in absolute terms, there were more fixations on the cage than on the
needle throughout (see Table 3c). However, in terms of the change in fixation
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probability, Figure 4c shows how fixation probabilities on the cage peak at
around the offset 200ms and then drop down somewhat, whilst fixation
probabilities on the needle steadily increase from around word offset onwards.
Discussion
The key finding in the competitor condition of Experiment 2 was that
attention was directed towards avisual referent that was similar in shape to the
dominant referent of a heard homonym even though (a) there was a picture of
the subordinate referent present, and (b) the linguistic context biased the
subordinate meaning of the homonym. Looks to the shape competitor were
more likely than were looks to an unrelated distractor. The data thus provide
evidence for the activation of the inappropriate dominant meaning of the
word ‘‘pen’’ even though no writing implement was present in the display. This
suggests that the perceptual (visual-shape) representations of the contextually
inappropriate dominant referent were accessed even though the contextually
more appropriate subordinate referent was depicted in the scene. Had there
been no more looks towards the sewing needle than towards the distractors,
we would have had to conclude that visual competitor effects are modulated
by the contextual appropriateness of the target concept. In the event, we
cannot completely rule out such modulation, and indeed, compared to the
visual competitor effect found in Experiment 1, the effect found here appears
relatively attenuated. However, this may in part be due to the copresence of a
visual referent that more completely matches the featural specification of the
target word ‘‘pen’’*in this respect, it is not particularly surprising that there
was an attenuated competitor effect relative to Experiment 1. Crucially, even if
there is some modulation by the context, it was not enough, in Experiment 2,
to eliminate competitor effects entirely. Visual competitor effects are thus
robust in the face of contextually more appropriate objects to which attention
is directed by the unfolding language (see the General Discussion).
In respect of the neutral and biasing conditions, the data are entirely
compatible with current accounts of lexical access*in a neutral context, there
were more looks after ‘‘pen’’ towards the dominant referent (the pen-writing
implement) than towards the subordinate referent, but this effect was
mediated, in the biasing condition, by the context which favoured looks
towards the subordinate referent (the pen-enclosure). And in this latter case,
although there was a consistently greater probability of fixation on the
Figure 4. Proportion of trials with a fixation on: (a) the dominant referent, the subordinate referent,
and the distractors in the neutral conditions; (b) the dominant referent, the subordinate referent, and
the distractors in the biasing conditions; (c) the shape competitor, the subordinate referent, and the
distractors in the competitor condition, in Experiment 2. The cues are synchronized to the acoustic
onset of the target word, and the x-axis shows time in milliseconds from this onset.













































subordinate referent, only fixations on the dominant referent increased during
and beyond the target word ‘‘pen’’*in effect the phonological information,
and the activation of the associated conceptual representation, modulated
looks towards the dominant meaning only (although all this means is that looks
to the subordinate meaning were at ceiling because of the prior sentential bias).
GENERAL DISCUSSION
By systematically controlling the relationship between the objects in the visual
displays and the unfolding speech signal, it has been possible to control the
extent to which semantic/visual features associated with the visual objects
match those associated with the concepts activated as the speech unfolds.
Experiment 1 was concerned with the manner in which information about the
shape of objects is activated from the spoken language. It was found that on
hearing ‘‘snake’’ participants shifted overt attention immediately towards a
picture of a conceptually unrelated object that has a similar global shape:
a cable. The finding that more looks were directed towards the cable, upon
hearing ‘‘snake’’, than towards any of the distractors suggests that hearing
‘‘snake’’ activated visual-shape information that overlapped with the visual-
shape of the visually concurrent cable (cf. Dahan & Tanenhaus, 2005).
These data are consistent with the notion that language-mediated eye
movements can be directed to objects that share some characteristics, but not
all, with the target specification determined by the unfolding word (Huettig &
Altmann, 2004). Huettig and Altmann (2005) found that language-mediated
eye movements are a sensitive index of the overlap between the conceptual
information conveyed by spoken words and the conceptual representations of
the concurrent visual objects. Hearing ‘‘piano’’ causes us to attend to a trumpet
because of the conceptual overlap between pianos and trumpets; activation of
these common conceptual features by the word ‘‘piano’’ attracts attention to
whatever in the visual field shares these conceptual features (see Huettig &
Altmann, 2004). These conceptual competitor effects are predicated on the
fact that participants viewed the objects in the visual display for approximately
5 s before hearing the target word*sufficient time in which to recognize the
objects for what they were. This raises the obvious question: Why, when we
hear ‘‘snake’’, should we move our eyes to the cable when, evidently, we know
that what we want is an animal, and that what we will get is a conductor for
transmitting electrical power? At least in the ‘‘piano’’-trumpet case the two
were conceptually related; the same cannot be said for cables and snakes.
The present data suggest that the answer to this is that participants shift
their attention towards the visual object in the display that best matches the
conceptual and perceptual specification of the concept activated by the
spoken word. In other words, the data suggest that the best matching object













































in the visual field is fixated even if this object has little in common with the
target concept activated by the spoken target word. An overlap in
characteristics such as an object’s shape will result in shifts of overt attention
to the visual object in the array that best matches the specification of the
concepts accessed by the spoken words (cf. Huettig & Altmann, 2004, 2005).
Indeed, on the assumption that experience of the events in which objects can
participate (with us or with each other) guides concept formation (cf.
McRae, Ferretti, & Amyote, 1997; Nelson, 1996), what we have hitherto
termed ‘‘conceptual’’ and ‘‘perceptual’’ may not be easily separated in cases
where perceptual form is inextricably bound to those experiences that have a
perceptual (i.e., some sensorimotoric) basis.
In addition, note that the shape competitor effects are unlikely to be
limited to the task employed here. Dahan and Tanenhaus (2005) demon-
strated similar visual form competitor effects when participants were
required to engage in an explicit physical task (moving the objects mentioned
in spoken sentences using a computer mouse). Similarly, Yee and Sedivy
(2006), using a task in which participants had to touch one of the displayed
objects on a computer screen, observed similar semantic effects to those
obtained by Huettig and Altmann (2005). In Experiment 1, we used a
variant of the paradigm in which, on experimental trials in the competitor
condition, the entity mentioned in the spoken sentence was not present in
the visual display. But the two types of competitor effects found here (visual-
shape and semantic) have also been observed when targets have been present
(visual-shape competitor effects, Dahan & Tanenhaus, 2005; semantic
competitor effects, Yee & Sedivy, 2006). Moreover, Huettig and Altmann
(2005) compared target-present and target-absent conditions and have
found, other than the tendency for fixations to targets to dominate when
targets are present, similar results across these conditions. Thus, these
competitor effects are not limited to certain specific goal-directed task
demands.3
However, our data do more than attest to the generalizability of the
Dahan and Tanenhaus (2005) demonstration of visual competitor effects;
the fact that a biasing context can cause increased looks towards an object in
a concurrent scene, but not towards a visual competitor of such an object,
3 The visual form and semantic competitor effects also rule out certain task-specific
strategies. It rules out the possibility that the mapping process is based merely on phonological
information associated with the visual objects. In other words, it could not be the case that
participants are covertly naming objects in the visual field, and then using the match between
these names and the unfolding speech stream to guide eye movements towards whichever
phonological matches are so obtained. Moreover, studies such as Salverda, Dahan, and
McQueen (2003) have shown how manipulations of fine-grained speech detail, while keeping the
display constant, modulate overt attention. Such effects can therefore not be attributed to a
prenaming strategy.













































constrains the range of explanations for how the eyes are directed, by the
unfolding speech, towards objects in the visual field. We suggest that it is not
the case that a spoken word activates a target concept whose visual features
initiate some form of visual search for corresponding features in the
concurrent scene (cf. Dahan & Tanenhaus, 2005). Rather, we suggest that
our data are more compatible with an account in which a spoken word
reactivates (or increases activation of) a target concept previously activated
by the visual experience of the corresponding object in the scene. It is not the
case that a visual referent is found in response to a ‘‘top-down’’ target
representation (as may be the case in standard visual search studies)
activated from the spoken input. It may be worth spelling out a step-by-
step description of task performance in our experiments. On display onset
participants start to view the four objects. This causes picture-derived
activations of representations (including visual form representations) that
are tied to their spatial location in the display. Note in this regard, that
participants had viewed the visual display with four objects for approxi-
mately 5 s before hearing the target word, and thus had sufficient time to
recognize the objects for what they were. As participants hear the spoken
language input language-derived representations (including visual form
representations) are activated. Overlap between the picture-derived repre-
sentations and the language-derived representations in turn causes eye
movements to the competitor objects in the display. Thus, the spoken input
selects from amongst the target representations activated from the prior
visual input.4
More importantly, we found that a context that biases looks towards an
object does not bias looks towards a visual competitor for that object*only
when a word is encountered whose associated conceptual representations
shares semantic/visual features with the target representations activated from
the scene do the eyes move towards whatever in the scene activated those
representations. Our data from Experiment 2 suggest, moreover, that
conceptual matches of this kind are limited only to the extent that the
conceptual representations activated by the spoken word might themselves
be limited*thus, even though the context may favour one meaning of a
homonym over another, so long as the other is activated, and so long as
there are objects in the visual scene whose conceptual representations share
features (even partially) with those activated representations, the eyes will be
directed towards those objects (and even when some of those objects are
better ‘‘fits’’ than others).
4 A full treatment of what drives attention is beyond the remit of this research. Nonetheless,
to fully understand how it is that language can mediate visual attention will require an
understanding also of attentional control.













































Our results thus suggest that visual form competition during language-
mediated attention is primarily lexically driven and not modulated by
contextual appropriateness. Experiment 1 showed that when hearing about
zookeepers, participants do not look at objects (a cable) that are visually
similar to a snake (which is semantically related to zookeepers) even though
they look at the snake itself when it is present in the display. However, as the
word ‘‘snake’’ acoustically unfolds, participants shift overt attention to the
cable. Thus, in Experiment 1, only hearing ‘‘snake’’ but not a contextual bias
towards snakes compelled the visual form effect. It could be argued that the
contextual bias in Experiment 1 was not sufficiently strong to induce such an
effect. Experiment 2, however, presents even greater evidence for the primacy
of lexical input. On hearing about welders, and with a pen-enclosure in the
display, participants do not look at a picture depicting the alternative
meaning of pen (nor the visual competitor of the alternative meaning). Only
on hearing ‘‘pen’’ did participants look at the contextually inappropriate
meaning of pen (or an object that shares some visual similarity with the
contextual inappropriate meaning of pen).
Though not ruling out modulation by linguistic context, the findings
presented here point towards the importance of lexical input for visual form
competition during language-mediated attention.5 It is interesting to note
the points of contact between the present findings and those more
commonly discussed in the context of models of lexical ambiguity resolu-
tion. In this regard, the close similarities between the present eye-movement
effects and other effects found in the psycholinguistic literature are quite
striking. The same key factors that have been found to influence lexical
ambiguity resolution during reading appear to have been responsible for
overt shifts in attention in Experiment 2. For instance, in the neutral context,
the dominant referent received more overt attention than did the sub-
ordinate referent when the homonym was encountered. This finding accords
well with effects concerning the relative frequencies of the alternative
meanings of ambiguous words found in eyetracking experiments concerning
reading (cf. Duffy et al., 1988). Similarly, the data support the notion that a
sentential context biasing the subordinate meaning of the homonym cannot
prevent the activation of the unintended and inappropriate dominant
meaning (cf. Onifer & Swinney, 1981). The present visual world study thus
also provides converging evidence for conclusions derived from other
psycholinguistic methods.
5 Some of the data reported here (e.g., the absence of modulation of the visual form effect by
contextual appropriateness) may appear inconsistent with some embodied theories of cognition.
In this regard, we would like to emphasize that the present research was not conducted to
evaluate theories of conceptual representation. Future work, however, could usefully be directed
at this issue.













































Finally, the present data clearly show that visual-shape information can
be activated very rapidly and well before word offset. Why otherwise would
our participants have shifted overt attention towards visually similar
objects? This raises the question why, using the lexical decision task, it
has been so difficult to find clear evidence for perceptual priming (cf. Pecher
et al., 1998) or why it was found to be delayed (cf. Moss et al., 1997). We can
only speculate here. However, there is an important methodological
distinction between the effects we, and others, have found within the visual
world paradigm, and the cross-modal priming effects reported by others.
Critically, in cross-modal priming, the auditory prime precedes the visual
(orthographic) target. Thus, any visual properties associated with the
conceptual representation activated by the spoken word could in principle
become activated before the onset of the visual target. But looks to a
visually or semantically related object in the visual scene are not the
equivalent of facilitatory priming of the visual target in cross-modal
priming. This is because in the visual world paradigm, the visual target
precedes the auditory signal*visual properties associated with the con-
ceptual representations ordinarily activated by the spoken word are not
activated before the onset of the visual objects; those visual properties have
already been activated, precisely because those visual objects precede the
spoken word. The implication of this for how to interpret time-course
information depicted in, for example, Figures 2 and 4 is that these graphs do
not necessarily indicate the time course of activation of visual feature
information associated with the unfolding word. Rather, they indicate the
time course of the process by which this information modulates the
activation of the episodic representations themselves activated, earlier, by
the visual scene.
In sum, the present data indicate that when people listen to spoken
language and are simultaneously presented with a number of visual
objects, perceptual synergies between the concepts activated by spoken
words and visual objects can mediate visual attention. Here we have
shown that the mapping between language and visual input can be
mediated by shape relations. We conclude that this visual form effect is
primarily lexically driven, and that the fit between language-derived
representations and the picture-derived representations can drive the eyes
towards appropriate, or inappropriate, objects in the visual environment.
Thus, such activation can under certain circumstances (e.g., during the
processing of dominant meanings of homonyms) constrain the direction
of visual attention even when that direction is clearly contextually
inappropriate.
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